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government to surrender.8 Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill, in "Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock" (1994), argue that the United States pursued "a clear and coherent strategy of 'shock,"' which was successful. The present article attempts to provide much more detailed and comprehensive analysis of the decision-making process in Japan leading to its surrender. 9 Other broader works that are germane to this article include Barton J. Bernstein's three reflective essays that appeared on the fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.10 "The Atomic Bombs Reconsidered," in particular, attracted considerable attention in Japan when its translation appeared in the respected monthly journal Chuo Koron ( Manhattan Project and the decision to use the bomb, but, when it comes to assessing the significance of the bomb, they base their interpretation on Blackett.24 Arai Shin'ichi has drawn on American works and the unpublished Stimson diaries for Gembaku toka e no michi [The road leading to the use of the atomic bomb] (1985), which leans toward the "atomic diplomacy" thesis and is the only scholarly monograph written by a Japanese historian.25 The eminent political scientist, Nagai Yonosuke, has published a brilliant theoretical analysis of the American decision to drop the bomb (1978) that tends to support the "orthodox" American interpretation.26
One thing is clear: Like their American colleagues, Japanese historians have not studied sufficiently the crucial period from Hiroshima to the surrender.27 It may well be that while the "atomic diplomacy" thesis heightens the Japanese sense of victimization, it also accords with their general unwillingness to come to grips with their responsibility for the Pacific War and its consequences. Consciously or unconsciously, historians have been affected by this climate of opinion-until recently. On August 6, 1995, on the fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima, the New York Times quoted-or actually misquoted-from the embryonic version of this article, calling me, in an ironic twist of logic, a "Japanese revisionist." It observed that such "revisionists" are still "a tiny minority" but "the taboos are breaking down in Japan."28 The disappearance of the "taboos" coincided, domestically, with Emperor Hirohito's death in 1989 and, externally, with the end of the Cold War.
Because of the nature of Japanese documentary source ma- 28. Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Bomb: An Act That Haunts Japan and America," New York Times, Aug. 6, 1995. For the nature of this "taboo," see Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches." terials concerning the decision to surrender, historians face enormous handicaps and frustrations. In the weeks before General Douglas MacArthur's arrival, the Japanese government destroyed much of its archives for fear that the materials might be used in the trials of war criminals. In addition to surviving official records, historians are forced to utilize such materials as postsurrender memoirs, testaments, and postwar "interrogations" of Japanese officials. Problematic manuscript sources include "Interrogations" and "Statements" (interviews) of Japanese military and civilian officials conducted from 1948 to 1950 by the Military History Section of G-2 of General MacArthur's General Headquarters (the United States Army, Far East Command). In these "statements" Japanese officials often contradicted themselves, and they were obviously anxious to please their American questioners.29 They were also eager to defend the emperor and protect the imperial institution.
Among published sources, Kido Koichi's diaries, meticulously edited by a group of scholars at the University of Tokyo, are the most reliable. Kido, as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, had special access to the emperor. He was a realist par excellence; some would call him an opportunist. In this article he figures as the foremost "peacemonger," in Toshikazu Kase's words.30 A wealth of various source materials-contemporaneous government documents, diaries, memoranda, and excerpts from 29. "Interrogations of Japanese Officials on World War II" (2 vols.; hereafter cited as "Interrogations") and "Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II" (4 vols.; hereafter cited as "Statements"). These interviews were conducted in preparation for General Douglas MacArthur's official war history, Reports of Gen- Togo recognized the possibility that the United States had exaggerated the bomb for propaganda purposes, he was impressed that American radio broadcasting was "rampant" and "massive." He probably recalled that the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, had threatened Japan with "prompt and utter destruction." Galvanized by a sense of urgency, he took the initiative in convening an emergency meeting of key cabinet ministers on the afternoon of August 7. 37 Deliberations at this cabinet meeting can be reconstructed from Togo's memoirs and other sources. The bombing of Hiroshima was the subject of discussion. Togo tried to find a breakthrough to surrender by quoting at great length American radio reports about the bomb. The U.S. government claimed that it had now "added a new and revolutionary increase in destruction," and that, unless Japan surrendered, the United States would keep dropping atomic bombs until Japan was extinct. Togo was resorting to the time-honored device of making the most of "external pressure"-the atomic bomb-to counter the army, which was adamant for a "decisive battle on the homeland" against an American invasion. In a line of argument that was to be repeated by the peace party, Togo reasoned that "the introduction of a new weapon, which had drastically altered the whole military situation, offered the military ample grounds for ending the war." He proposed that surrender be considered at once on the basis of terms presented in the Potsdam Declaration. (When those in the peace party talked about "accepting the Potsdam terms," they meant acceptance with one crucial condition: retention of the emperor system.) However, the military authorities refused to concede that the United States had used an atomic weapon. Given the army's intransigence, it was impossible for the cabinet to take up Togo's proposal. 38 About noon on August 7, Kido Koichi, the emperor's most important adviser ("the eyes and ears of the Throne"),39 re- Togo said, "has not only revolutionized modern warfare but has also brought about a great social upheaval and transformation of the daily lives of ordinary individuals as well. This is to be used as the turning point in bringing an end to the war"-on condition, of course, that the emperor system be retained. Emphasizing the urgency of the situation, Togo said that the United States would continue to drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities, as President Truman had warned, unless Japan ended the war at once. As Togo recalled in his memoirs, Hirohito emphatically concurred. "That is just so," he replied, and went on to divulge his own firm determination:
Now that such a new weapon has appeared, it has become less and less possible to continue the war. We must not miss a chance to terminate the war by bargaining [with the Allied powers] for more favorable conditions now. Besides, however much we consult about [surrender] terms we desire, we shall not be able to come to an agreement. So my wish is to make such arrangements as will end the war as soon as possible.44
In these words the emperor expressed his conviction that a speedy surrender was the only feasible way to save Japan. On the night of August 8, Suzuki told Sakomizu Hisatsune, chief cabinet secretary, "Now that we know it was an atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima, I will give my views on the termination of the war at tomorrow's Supreme War Council, and I want you to make preparations for me."46 After the war Suzuki recalled: "The atomic bomb provided an additional reason for surrender as well as an extremely favorable opportunity to commence peace talks. I believed such an opportunity could not be afforded by B-29 bombings alone."47 The hitherto vacillating and sphinx-like Suzuki had finally made up his mind. It is important to note that Suzuki did so before he was informed of the Soviet entry into the war early on the following day.48 Sakomizu also felt that "the army will admit that now that the atomic bomb has come into existence, it precludes war between a nation that possesses the atomic bomb and one that does not."49 However, the army was not to be so easily swayed.
Japan's "Longest Day"-and Night
At dawn on August 9, Tokyo intercepted a TASS broadcast that the Soviet Union had declared war. Within hours the Red Army's mechanized forces bypassed or overwhelmed Japanese units on the Manchurian border and threw the Kwantung Army into confusion. The Japanese government's panic was now complete. Until the moment of the Soviet entry, Tokyo had been trying to obtain Soviet mediation for favorable surrender terms from the United States; now this last hope was dashed. Prime Minister Suzuki's military estimate was that Japan would be able to hold out against the Soviets in Manchuria for at least two months.50 However, Lieutenant General Ikeda Sumihisa, who had been transferred from vice-chief of staff of the Kwantung Army to head the Cabinet's Compre- Hirohito, having been apprised of the Soviet entry by Suzuki, summoned Lord Privy Seal Kido to his underground air-raid shelter at 9:55 a.m. In light of the Soviet entry, Hirohito said, it was all the more urgent to find means to end the war. He commanded Kido to "have a heart-to-heart talk" with Prime Minister Suzuki at once. Coincidentally, Suzuki hadjust arrived at the palace, so Kido immediately conveyed the imperial wish to him, emphasizing the importance of immediately accepting the Potsdam terms. Suzuki assured Kido of his determination to end the war speedily, and at 10:55 Kido again had an audience with the emperor to assure him that "the prime minister agrees there is no other way."53 Meanwhile, the Supreme War Council had convened at 10:30 a.m., August 9, in an atmosphere of "impatience, frenzy, and bewilderment," as recalled by Fujita Hisanori, the grand chamberlain.54 It was arguably Japan's most fateful day-and night. All the members of the council recognized that it was impossible to continue the war much longer, but would they be able to come to a decision for surrender? To reach that decision, the government machinery required that the Supreme War Council and the cabinet achieve unanimity of views. be reached or the Suzuki cabinet would collapse; in either case, a swift surrender would be aborted. Prime Minister Suzuki opened the meeting by observing: 'Just when we were smarting from the extremely great shock of the Hiroshima bomb, the Soviet Union entered the war. Continuation of the war is totally impossible, and whether willing or not we have no choice but to accept the Potsdam terms." Foreign Minister Togo, known for his logical mind, forcefully stated that Japan must immediately accept the Potsdam terms with the sole condition being that the Allies "guarantee the emperor's position." He informed the council members of the emperor's conviction that, since the atomic bomb had made its appearance, continuation of the war had become utterly impossible.55
What the peace party had been worrying about most was how many more A-bombs the United States had in readiness. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the Supreme War Council meeting, "a rather bullish atmosphere" prevailed, as Admiral Toyoda Soemu, Chief of the Naval General Staff, recalled in his memoirs. "To be sure, the damage of the atomic bomb is extremely heavy, but it is questionable whether the United States will be able to use more bombs in rapid succession."56 Although the proceedings of the council meeting do not exist, it appears that Army Minister Anami indulged in wishful thinking when he said that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was the only atomic bomb the United States possessed.
At precisely this moment, just before 1:00 p.m., news reached the meeting that a second atomic bomb had been dropped on Nagasaki. The impact of another set of "twin shocks-Hiroshima and Nagasaki-was devastating. Suzuki now began to fear that "the United States, instead of staging the invasion of Japan, will keep on dropping atomic bombs."57 Although Japan had measures to cope with the American invasion, nothing could be done about the continuation of atomic bombings.
We must pause here to ask whether the Nagasaki bomb was necessary. The Hiroshima bomb had already jolted Japan's 55. Gaimusho peace party to move toward surrender. The strategic value of a second bomb was minimal. With all land communications severed between Tokyo and Hiroshima, the full extent of the Hiroshima disaster had not yet sunk in among leaders in Tokyo; there had been an interval of only three days between the two bombs. On the other hand, from the standpoint of its shock effect, the political impact of the Nagasaki bomb cannot be denied. Army Minister Anami's wishful thinking was shattered; if two bombs were available, then maybe there were three or even four.58 In fact, rumor had it that Tokyo would be atomicbombed on August 12 and that many more cities would be incinerated. The Nagasaki bomb, which instantly killed approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people, was unnecessary to induce Japan to surrender, but it probably had confirmatory effects.59
The news of the Nagasaki bombing notwithstanding, a heated argument continued at the Supreme War Council. Togo, who strongly urged surrender, with the one condition regarding the emperor system, was supported by Navy Minister Yonai, a taciturn admiral known for his liberal views and avowed connections with the navy's "peace maneuvers" (behind-the-scenes political activities centering on Admiral Okada Keisuke and Rear Admiral Takagi Sokichi). But Army Minister Anami adamantly objected.
It is difficult to grasp Anami's position. In Bernstein's apt expression, he was "the keystone in the arch of power that could lead to peace or prolonged war." Anami was a straightforward man, a typical samurai warrior and a master at archery 59. There was no separate decision to use the second bomb; the local commander was ordered to use additional bombs as they became ready. and swordsmanship. His loyalty to the emperor was unquestioned; he had served as Hirohito's military aide-de-camp from 1929 through 1933. And he knew the emperor wished the war brought to an end. It is on record that he had met Togo at the army minister's official residence on the evening of August 7 from 6:30 to 9:00, had had a heart-to-heart talk with Togo, and had conceded that "defeat was a matter of time."60 However, when he left his office on the morning of August 9 to attend the Supreme War Council meeting, he told Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff Kawabe Torashiro: "Upon my word I assure you it is going to be a hell of a stormy meeting!"61
At the Supreme War Council, Anami in his calmer moments seemed ready to accept the Potsdam terms "in principle" but with certain conditions. At his more belligerent moments, he cried out for a decisive homeland battle. The fact was that Anami, "the darling of the Army," commanded the full confidence of young officers, and he was now under strong pressure from these fire-eating subordinates. Whatever his inner thoughts, Anami insisted not only on the preservation of the imperial institution but also on the "three additional conditions": (1) that there be no military occupation of the homeland by the Allies; (2) that the armed forces be allowed to disarm and demobilize themselves voluntarily; and (3) that war criminals be prosecuted by the Japanese government. These were "absolute" conditions, Anami said, and Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu Yoshijiro and Chief of the Naval General Staff Toyoda supported Anami. These military chiefs contended that retention of the emperor system was inconceivable if Japan's homeland were occupied by foreign troops and the Japanese forces disbanded.62 In reality, however, they were trying to save their own skins. Of course, the "three additional conditions" flew in the face of the Potsdam Declaration, and it was apparent that the United States, its resolve bolstered by the I surmise that the atomic bomb was dropped with the intention of posing a grave threat to Japanese leaders and the people at large, forcefully compelling them to end the war. And certainly the bomb had that effect. However, we of the peace party had already been scheming for a termination of the war, and it is not correct to say that we were driven by the atomic bomb to end the war. Rather, it might be said that we of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our endeavor to end the war.72 ( What the deciphered Japanese dispatches reveal, however, were indecision and contradiction in Tokyo; the Japanese government could never agree on surrender terms. The cable messages went round and round: Togo, under pressure from the military, repeated that Japan could never accept an unconditional surrender, while the more realistic Sato entreated for "specific" mediation terms and "a concrete plan for terminating the war." As was to be expected, the Soviet response was chilly: Solomon A. Lozovsky, Deputy Foreign Commissar, replied that the emperor's message "contained mere generalities and no concrete proposal." In the end the Soviet government flatly rejected the Japanese proposal to send the emperor's special emissary, Konoe Fumimaro, to Moscow on the ground that the Japanese proposal was too "opaque" regarding surrender conditions.92 Through these efforts Japan merely wasted valuable time. There is thus very little likelihood of any missed opportunity here.
If any opportunity were missed, it may have been Japan's failure to accept the Potsdam Declaration of July 26. Togo at once noted from its wording ("The following are our terms...") that it actually amounted to a "conditional surrender." Although it said nothing about the emperor system, he interpreted the declaration as offering the basis of a negotiated peace. The upper echelons of the Foreign Ministry were agreed that the Potsdam terms be accepted at once.93 However, the Japanese military found the Potsdam terms unacceptable because they contained the "three conditions": Allied trial of Japanese war criminals, demobilization and disarmament of Japanese forces by the Allies, and an Allied military occupation of Japan. Japan's military chiefs had been watching with increasing fear the Allies' stern treatment of Nazi leaders and German war criminals. Likewise, the Potsdam terms demanded the eradication of Japanese "militarism" and the elimination of military leaders. The atomic bomb was a golden opportunity given by Heaven for Japan to end the war. There were those who said that the Japanese armed forces were not defeated. It was in science that Japan was defeated, so the military will not bring shame on themselves by surrendering.
He added that "in ending the war, the idea was to put the responsibility for defeat solely on the atomic bomb, not on the military. This was a clever pretext." From that viewpoint, the endeavor to end the war may be said to have been "a search for ways to save the military's face," although such a face-saving argument was not needed for the highest army officials, Anami and Umezu.115
As Sakomizu recollected, "It was commonly understood at that time that the invention of the atomic bomb spelled the end of the war. The power that possessed the atomic bomb will win the war."116 In point of fact, the Japanese government and the military had embarked on research on the bomb. Prime Minister Tojo Hideki took a personal interest in the Japanese bomb project, believing that "the atomic bomb would spell the difference between life and death in this war." It was the con- 
Conclusion
The above analysis has shown that in August 1945 Japan's peace party made the maximum political use of the atomic bomb to end the war. To them the bomb was "a gift from Heaven," "a golden opportunity," and "a psychological moment" to end the war; they saw the bomb as "assisting" their peace efforts and as a means for the military to save face. But such a utilitarian viewpoint, which regarded the atomic bomb merely as an expedient for inducing surrender, hardly prompted an awareness of the transformation wrought in the fabric of international society by the appearance of the nuclear weapon. Regarding the bomb as if it were a natural calamity also inhibited soul-searching reflection on the war that Japan had started and lost. An embodiment of scientific advances that went be- In vain, on this historic day for Japan, I looked for soul-searching, for penitence, for a sign that the lessons of defeat had been taken to heart. The Premier has issued a statement filled with generalities. The press has contented itself with pious phrases....This would have been a good day for the Japanese press to begin telling the people the real and complete story of the war and defeat.122
Today, fifty-three years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the question of Japan's "war responsibility" still remains with the nation. 123 Perhaps no account of Japan's surrender decision is complete without counterfactuals, however risky they may be. This essay has shown that conventional bombing by B-29s alone would not have driven Hirohito to say "we must bow to the inevitable and surrender as speedily as possible." The crucial actor here was the Japanese military, and only the shock of the bombs followed by the Soviet entry could have thrown them off balance and led to surrender-and this narrowly.
We must then ask this question: Without the use of the atomic bomb, but with Soviet entry and with continued strategic bombing and naval blockade, would Japan have surrendered before November 1-the day scheduled for the U.S. invasion of Kyushu?
Available Japanese data do not provide a conclusive answer.124 In June 1945 Japanese leaders agreed that food shortages would become critical in the autumn and toward the onset of the cold season; the country had suffered a "disastrous" fail- 
